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1.0  Introduction 
 
1.1  The movement of skilled people from one country to another is one of the most hotly 
contested public policy questions today.  Debates amongst politicians, academics and 
bureaucrats about the scale and character of skilled migration, and the policies required to 
address these movements, are taking place in countries throughout the world (Zweig and 
Changgui 1995; Odunsi 1996; Phillips 1996; Carrington and Detragiache 1998; Iredale 
1998; Iqbal 1999).  As the opportunities for skilled personnel to move increases with 
globalization and the shift to a service economy (Sassen 1988, 1998), as the costs of 
international travel decrease, and as the ability to communicate with other parts of the 
world becomes easier, it is likely that skilled migration itself will increase over the next 
few decades, magnifying its importance as a public policy issue.   
 
1.2  Compared to the volume of unskilled and forced migration, the international movement 
of skilled people is still relatively small (Findlay 1995), but its social and economic 
relevance outweighs its numerical significance for a number of reasons, some imagined, 
some real.  The loss of a country’s ‘best and brightest’ is seen not only as a loss of human 
resources but also as a general indicator of whether a country is a desirable place to live.  
Nothing conjures up the image of a country gone wrong like the belief that skilled people 
are leaving in droves: a public litmus test of sorts where citizens vote with their feet.  If 
true, a skilled exodus heralds tougher times to come, as human and financial capital 
moves with skilled nationals. 
 
1.3  Given the far-reaching social and economic implications of the so-called ‘brain drain’ it 
is not surprising that there has been much public and academic hyperbole on the matter.  
Political leaders declare emigrants unpatriotic and selfish, while the media make wild and 
unsubstantiated statements about the extent of emigration and the motivations for it.  
Southern Africa is no different in this respect.  Skilled migration is currently a topic of 
hot debate in the region and it has attracted a wide range of claims and counter-claims, 
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particularly in South Africa where the emigration of skilled nationals has generated 
considerable public attention during and since the demise of apartheid.   
 
2.0   Debating the Brain Drain 
 
2.1  In the early 1990s the brain drain became a card in the hands of those arguing for the 
entrenchment of white political privilege (Rule 1989, 1994).1  The issue re-emerged with 
unexpected force after 1994.   Banner headlines declaring an “Exodus as Rainbow 
Nation’s iridescence fades” (Financial Mail, 25 October 1996), “74% with skills want to 
quit SA?” (Sunday Times, 13 September 1998), and “Brain Drain Reaching Mind-
bending Proportions (Cape Argus, 4 August 2000) contributed to a “moral panic” over 
the state of the country’s social and economic stability.  The Sunday Times fuelled a 
national controversy on the subject, which started with a speech in Mauritius at a SADC 
conference by President Nelson Mandela where he suggested that “whites were running 
away from their country” and asserted that “the real South Africans were being sorted out 
in the process”. Equally strong responses from government officials attempting to defend 
their post-apartheid record have polarized the debate. 
 
2.2   In other SADC countries, the longstanding brain drain debate is a great deal more 
sophisticated and less polarized (Prah 1989; Zinyama 1990; Saasa 1996; Sachikonye 
1998).  At independence in the 1960s and 1970s, most countries inherited a woefully 
underdeveloped local skills base.   Much advanced training had, of necessity, to take 
place outside the country or region.  Governments sending students overseas confronted 
the challenge of drawing them back again once trained.  Local training became a much 
more attractive and cost-effective alternative and there was dramatic expansion of higher 
education in most SADC states.  Independence also saw a major expansion in the 
numbers of highly skilled expatriates arriving in these countries, primarily from Europe, 
North America and the rest of Africa.   Organizations such as the IOM also set up 
programmes to encourage skilled nationals to return home (Weiss 1998).2 
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2.3  Independent governments played a delicate game, offering skilled expatriates sufficient 
inducement to come and pass on their skills and experience while dissuading them from 
staying permanently.    In the 1980s and 1990s, various new developments refocused the 
brain-drain debate as many countries faced, for the first time, a potential drain of local 
skills to other countries within the SADC.   
 
2.4  The first movement of significance was the so-called  “white flight” to South Africa from 
countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Crush 2000a).  Politically their departure 
was unlamented but their exodus left sudden holes in the private and public skills base.   
Deteriorating economic conditions in some states (as a result of civil strife and South 
Africa’s war of destabilization) led to further uncertainty and departures, this time of 
skilled blacks.  From the late 1970s, a silent drift of skills began from SADC and other 
African countries (particularly Ghana and Uganda) to the ‘independent’ South African 
homelands of Transkei and Bophuthatswana.  Prah’s (1989, 14) study of what he called 
“the great trek of talent” to the homelands involved an estimated 7,000 highly-skilled 
Africans by the late 1980s.       
 
2.5  In the early 1990s, the end of apartheid produced fears within SADC of a renewed brain 
drain to South Africa from the rest of the region (Saasa 1996).   Initially, these fears 
seemed justified.  Skills migration to South Africa from all other SADC states jumped 
significantly in the run-up to the 1994 election. Some 200 medical doctors reportedly left 
Zimbabwe for Botswana and South Africa in 1992 alone (Saasa 1996, 65).   Experts 
projected further losses and a significant impact on struggling local economies.  The 
region’s loss would be South Africa’s gain, further exacerbating chronic regional 
inequalities.   These fears have actually been muted by post-1994 South African 
immigration policy which placed a very low premium on skills import from anywhere 
(Crush 1999).  The other SADC states have been the unwitting beneficiaries of South 
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Africa’s anti-immigrationism.  Work permits have been hard to come by and the 
movement of skilled Africans into South Africa has not yet reached anticipated levels.   
 
3.0   Finding the Right Numbers 
 
3.1  The need for reliable data on the extent and impact of skilled migration cannot be 
overstated, as the recent South African furore amply demonstrates.   Unfortunately, the 
debate has been based more on misinformation and conjecture than methodologically 
sound research, with the Sunday Times article mentioned above being a good case in 
point.  Although an impressive 11,000 people responded to a questionnaire in the 
“appointments” section of the newspaper, there is no way of knowing if the sample was 
representative of the skilled population in the country as a whole, making the survey 
entirely unreliable.  Moreover, the largely financial and managerial nature of the jobs 
advertised constitutes a very narrow definition of skills, and the people reading the 
appointments section are more likely to be out of work, about to change their jobs, or 
dissatisfied with their current job – not a normal cross-section of skilled personnel.  The 
readership of that paper is also largely white and English-speaking.   
 
3.2  Another problem with the Sunday Times survey was that responses came from those who 
were sufficiently motivated to fill out the questionnaire and return it by post.  Surveys 
that require people to post back responses, or phone in their opinions, are likely to be 
biased since those who have strong opinions are more likely to take the time to fill the 
questionnaire out and return it.  In this case, the odds are strong that the sample is over-
represented by people who want to make a statement about their disillusionment with the 
current state of affairs.   In other words, the responses that led to the front-page banner 
headline and kicked off a national debate came from a group of people who read a 
traditionally white, English-language Sunday newspaper, and who are more likely to be 
dissatisfied with their present lot in life than a true cross-section of skilled South 
Africans.  
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3.3   There have been few serious efforts hitherto to take the brain-drain debate beyond the 
level of anecdote and hearsay.  While Prah (1989) did make a serious effort at a 
representative survey of skills migration to the South African bantustans, the topic was of 
limited scope and the sample size  small.   Considerably more problematic was a survey 
by Polonsky et al. (1988,1989) of 73 emigrating South Africans on board a cruise ship 
destined for Australia, research that was subsequently published as a serious academic 
contribution.   Policy making on a topic as important as the brain drain must be based on 
far more sound and rigorous methodological research than this.  
 
3.4  In 1998, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) instituted a series of nationally-
representative  surveys in the SADC region on the attitudes of skilled people towards 
migration.  Nationally representative surveys were conducted in South Africa, Botswana 
and Lesotho to provide detailed information on the scale and character of skilled 
migration (plans to include Zimbabwe were postponed due to the unexpected closure of 
the university at the time of the research).   Future research on this issue is planned for 
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique and will be published separately by 
SAMP.3  
 
3.5   The research project was broken into three components.  The first component was 
interviews with “skilled nationals” – i.e., skilled people who are citizens and residents of 
the country surveyed.  A total of 1,257 people were interviewed from a range of 
occupations and training: 725 in South Africa; 306 in Lesotho; and 226 in Botswana.   
The samples were based on the best demographic information available for skilled 
nationals in each of the countries and were conducted using rigorous selection methods 
and trained interviewers (more detailed methodological descriptions are provided in the 
text of each chapter).  Sample selection and questionnaires were consistent across the 
three countries.   In South Africa, in particular, random sampling produced a highly-
skewed sample by race with whites predominating in the sample.  This is regrettable but 
Southern African Migration Project  Thinking About the Brain Drain in Southern Africa 
 
6 
inevitable given the apartheid legacy which denied blacks access to advanced training 
and skills development.4 
   
3.6   The second component of the research was interviews with non-citizens living and 
working in the country where they were interviewed.  These samples were also broadly 
representative of the pool of skilled people in this category, and sample selection and 
questionnaire formats were also consistent for the countries surveyed.  A total of 400 
interviews were conducted in South Africa and 125 in Botswana.  Unfortunately, unrest 
in Lesotho and the subsequent intervention of SADC forces in September of 1998 
interrupted interviews in that country and data collection was halted after only 67 
interviews with skilled foreigners. 
 
3.7   The third component of the research was interviews with employers of skilled personnel.  
This work was only conducted in South Africa, due to logistical and budgetary 
constraints, and consisted of interviews with 200 public and private sector organizations 
from a wide range of industrial, commercial and service areas (e.g., medicine, law, 
mining, information technology).  Once again, these interviews are broadly representative 
of skilled employers in the country and sampling and interviewing techniques followed 
standard research practices. 
 
3.8   A related piece of research (already reported on in Policy Brief No. 5) was conducted by 
the South African National Skills Abroad (SANSA) network at the University of Cape 
Town.  SANSA examined the pool of skilled South African nationals living in other parts 
of the world (predominantly Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) and 
attempted to gauge both the quantitative and qualitative character of this diaspora.   
 
3.9   In total, over 2,000 people were interviewed by SAMP in three different countries, with 
an additional 2,000 diasporic skilled South Africans covered in the SANSA data base.  
This research therefore represents the widest sampling of skilled personnel yet conducted 
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in Southern Africa.   It serves as a reliable baseline of empirical data as well as a 
methodological yardstick for future research on the topic.   
 
4.0  Defining Skills 
 
4.1  It is important to explain at the outset what SAMP understand by the term “skilled” in its 
policy research.   The idea of a brain drain implies a depletion of skilled people who are 
vital to the functional core of a national economy.  While actual definitions of skilled 
persons may vary, they all tend to focus on people who have received some sort of 
specialized training that results in superior technical competence, talent, or abilities that 
are applied in professional occupations.  Without these people, the operation and 
development of the economy would be severely hindered.  
 
4.2  We have therefore opted for a relatively broad definition of the term “skilled”, one that 
encompasses a broader range of skills than the popular wisdom might imply.  The 
functional core of an economy does not only consist of people with post-graduate 
degrees, in well-paying, high-level corporate positions.  It is also sustained by people 
who, despite having no advanced formal education, have worked their way up the 
corporate ladder, have started their own successful businesses, or play a critical role in 
the public sector.  Our samples therefore include anyone who has special training or work 
experience which is in relative short supply in relation to the labour market as a whole.  
Doctors, accountants, engineers and other professionals who are typically associated with 
skilled migration have certainly been included in the samples, but the skills base is not 
restricted to these categories.   
 
4.3  The samples are also contextualized, in that what is deemed an important skill in one 
country may not be important in another.  In Lesotho, for example, interviewees were 
drawn from a core list of professions but a decision was made to also include teachers 
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and skilled artisans, since people from these areas are regularly seeking, and often 
finding, jobs in South Africa, and are in short supply in Lesotho.   
   
5.0  Challenging Brain Drain Stereotypes 
 
5.1  Official figures, in South Africa at least, dramatically undercount the extent of 
emigration.  On the other hand, the SAMP surveys show that the alarmist rhetoric of 
crisis that pervades discussion of the brain drain in the popular press may be misplaced.  
There is no doubt that there are thousands of South Africans, Batswana and Basotho 
leaving their countries to live and work in other countries in the region and other parts of 
the world, but the situation is far from desperate and there is no indication of a looming 
mass exodus in the near future.  Skilled nationals in all three countries are generally 
satisfied with their work and social lives and have no immediate plans to leave.  
Moreover, there is a pool of skilled foreigners who are equally satisfied with their lives in 
their host country and do not plan on leaving in the near future.  Finally, and perhaps 
most revealing of all, employers of skilled personnel in South Africa do not appear to be 
having major problems hiring skilled nationals (with the notable, and globally relevant, 
exception of information technology personnel). 
 
5.2   This is not to deny that many skilled people have given thought to leaving their home 
country or  to say that South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana have an excess of skilled 
people ready to fill any vacant post.   In South Africa, an extremely high 69% of skilled 
nationals said that they have given the idea of emigration “some thought”.  Many have 
also made contact with potential employers overseas and many more have friends, 
colleagues or family members who have already emigrated, serving as examples and 
valuable reference points for their own possible emigration.   
 
5.3  But thinking about leaving, and actually doing so, are very different things.  Only 20% of 
the skilled South Africans interviewed by SAMP said that it was “very likely” that they 
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would leave the country for a period of more than two years and only 3% said that it was 
“very likely” that they would leave within the next six months.  A composite statistical 
index used to construct each person’s “emigration potential” showed that only 2% of the 
sample falls into the “very high” category.  These are hardly grounds for construction of a 
moral panic about a middle class exodus (Haffajee 1998).   
 
5.4   Skilled nationals in Botswana and Lesotho have a similar profile, although attitudes in 
Lesotho may have changed after the SADC intervention in 1998.   In Zimbabwe, recent 
political developments also appear to have influenced the attitudes of skilled personnel 
towards emigration.   But the survey results described here do reveal a remarkable 
stability and commitment amongst skilled professionals to the home country in at least 
three SADC states.    
 
5.5  In terms of skilled foreigners, the surveys found that these people are also, by and large, 
happy to be living and working in their adopted country.  Most have strong transnational 
links back home, send remittances to family and friends, visit home on a regular basis 
and are proud to call themselves a citizen of their home country.  Many also say that they 
want to return home at some point.  But there is no sense of a large or immediate exodus 
from the host country.  Skilled foreigners are generally satisfied with their jobs, and with 
their colleagues, and are involved in the communities where they live.  They have, in 
other words, settled down for the medium term, if not permanently.     
 
5.6   To risk a metaphor, skilled people in the region, be they skilled nationals or skilled 
foreigners, know where their suitcases are and have given some thought to what it would 
take to pack up and leave the country, but the suitcases are still in the cupboard and there 
are no plans to pull them out in the immediate future.  There is no sense from this 
research that skilled people are going to make a rush on the banks, pack their things and 
leave tomorrow.  Whether citizens or permit holders, skilled people in the three countries 
surveyed have significant material and emotional ties to the countries where they live and 
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work: homes, friends, families, communities, jobs, and careers.  There is a sense of 
patriotism and commitment to the home/host country that is largely ignored in the 
popular coverage of the brain-drain issue.  If skilled people in the region have an 
alternative destination in mind, it is by and large a destination unknown, with no set 
timetable. 
    
5.7   Another important aspect of the research worth highlighting here is the challenge it offers 
to stereotypes about emigration, particularly in South Africa.  Popular myth in South 
Africa has it that English-speaking white males are most likely to want to leave the 
country, with women, Afrikaners and black South Africans, in that order, more likely to 
stay due to a lack of skills, a lack of a second passport, or a deeper commitment and ties 
to the country.  Our survey of skilled nationals in South Africa, however, suggests that 
English-speaking whites are just as likely to want to stay in the country and that black 
South Africans and Afrikaners are almost as likely to want to leave.   Only in the area of 
gender do there appear to be significant differences, with men in general more likely to 
leave than women.  However, because men also dominate the more mobile professions, it 
is hard to say whether this is a function of inherent gender preference or simply a 
function of gendered structural inequality in the labour market. 
 
6.0  Implications for Immigration Policy 
 
6.1  The policy implications arising from this discussion are important to identify. Given the 
importance of the South African labour market in the region (and, indeed, on the 
continent), as well as the impending reforms to that country’s immigration policy, it is 
worth relating the findings of this research to the new immigration policy embodied in 
the 2002 Immigration Act (RSA 1999, 2000).5    The Act replaces the Aliens Control Act, 
the last major piece of apartheid-era legislation left on the books in South Africa, with 
far-reaching implications for South African citizens, residents and visitors. 
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6.2  The first point to emphasize is that the first term of office of South Africa’s post-
apartheid government was characterized by a general suspicion towards most forms of 
immigration (Croucher 1998; Crush 1998; Peberdy 1999).   Temporary and permanent 
immigration of skilled personnel have declined consistently since 1994.  The government 
has come recently to revise its view and admit that skills immigration is not necessarily 
disadvantageous to South Africans.   Indeed, the 1999 White Paper on International 
Migration explicitly asserts the government’s  stated interest in “attract[ing] qualified 
people in South Africa to offset the brain drain” (RSA 1999, 30).  In early 2001, the ANC 
endorsed this policy goal. 
 
6.3   The reasons for this softening of position are not unrelated to the lobbying efforts of big 
business.   Some of these complaints are perfectly legitimate. The Department of Home 
Affairs is seriously under-resourced and, under the archaic Aliens Control Act, lacked the 
mechanisms to speed skills entry.   Press reports suggest that it is still dealing with the 
skills needs of South African corporations in an ad hoc and unpredictable manner (Anon. 
1999; Steinberg 1999).  The lobbying of South African and international business 
involves the idea of a “skills crisis”.  This crisis is supposedly crippling South Africa’s 
international competitiveness.   Interestingly, however, the magnitude and impact of the 
skills haemorrhage are simply assumed rather than demonstrated.  The government has 
similarly made no systematic effort to quantitatively demonstrate that there is actually a 
brain drain of crisis proportions.6     
 
6.4  The new strategy for attracting skilled personnel to South Africa has two dimensions.  
First, the Minister of Home Affairs has suggested that the South African government 
needed to make it easier for skilled persons to obtain extended work permits and/or 
permanent residency for themselves and their families.  Second, he proposed to let 
“market forces” determine where skills are most needed in the economy.  The state, 
through the agency of the proposed Immigration Services, would monitor the skilled 
labour market, and would establish a national training fund that employers who hire 
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skilled foreigners would need to pay into to train South Africans for future jobs, but the 
bulk of the decision-making would be delegated to employers.7 
 
6.5  The proposal to make it easier for qualified persons to obtain visas, work permits and 
temporary resident status for themselves and their families is a welcome corrective to the 
immigrant decision-making of the past.  Simplification of administration and greater 
consistency in policy should go a long way toward attracting skilled people to the 
country.  There are, however, a number of problematic assumptions and contradictory 
lines of argument in these proposals.   
 
6.6  The first problem is that skilled emigration (the brain drain) is not necessarily as 
significant a problem is it made out to be.   In uncritically accepting popular wisdom on 
the issue without questioning the validity of the ‘facts’ which led to this conclusion, the 
White Paper unwittingly set the country up for a series of policy reforms which may not 
address the demographic and attitudinal realities of skilled migration. At the very least, 
the SAMP research reported here suggests that popular assumptions about the migration 
plans of skilled South African nationals and skilled foreigners cannot be taken for granted 
and that much more (sound) research is needed on this important topic. 
 
6.7   A second problem concerns the proposed mechanisms for selecting skilled immigrants.  
As noted, the fundamental objective is to let “market forces” decide what kinds of skilled 
people are needed in the country.  In its rejection of a centralized, state-run ‘points 
system’ such as has been used in Canada and other immigrant-receiving countries to 
determine where skills are most needed, the White Paper argued that “[i]t is difficult for 
Government to determine what type of skills are required within South Africa, and who 
the people are that can contribute to our economic growth”.8  In the “final analysis, only 
the industry can tell who the industry needs, why and for how long”.  The White Paper 
argued that “it would be simpler if the industry by itself could determine what it needs to 
grow and prosper and were able to satisfy these needs from the world labour market” and 
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proposed that Home Affairs delegate power to corporations to issue visas and permits 
(RSA 1999, 29-31).  
 
6.8   There is a fundamental tension between a laissez-faire approach to letting the market 
determine who should be let into the country and the legacy of control that has been so 
much a part of immigration policy and culture in the South African government in the 
past.  White Paper statements like “the migration system should enable Government to 
retain control over who may enter the country and the conditions and length of his or her 
stay” (RSA 1999, 17) are in direct contrast to the  neoliberalism that also guides the 
document – e.g., “any government is likely to fail if it attempts to counter market forces 
moved by the invisible hand of economic fundamentals” (RSA 1999, 20). 
 
6.9   The proposal to require employers to pay into a national fund to provide training to South 
Africans proved highly controversial.  Official logic was that this fund would effectively 
make the cost of hiring a foreigner higher than that of an equivalently qualified South 
African.   Thus, employers would only hire foreign workers when they really needed to 
do so.  That this would happen even without this disincentive seemed lost on the drafters.   
More persuasively, the funds would add value to programmes aimed at expanding the 
skills base of South Africans.  Nevertheless,  the practicalities of such a system remain 
open to doubt and it would be almost impossible to enforce in a consistent and fair 
manner.   And because skilled foreign migrants are also already likely to be more 
expensive to hire, this will be seen as an additional penalty for hiring workers that are 
actually needed.  Such a policy could act as a disincentive to immigration and settlement 
by skilled non-citizens. This is only partially resolved by the proposed five-year 
residence requirement for citizenship.  
 
6.10  A third issue is the manner in which the new approach to skilled migration creates a sense 
of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ immigrants.  From the very beginning of the document, the White 
Paper made it clear that it sought to “let people who add value to our society in and to 
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keep those that do not, out” (RSA 1999, 9).  The people who add value are “those who 
invest, are entrepreneurs and promote trade, those who bring new knowledge and 
experience to our society and those who have the skills and expertise required to do the 
things we cannot properly do at this stage.”  Undesirables, by default, are those who do 
not have these skills or resources – in other words, poor and “unskilled” migrants who 
“compete for scare resources” and “insufficient job opportunities,” become “involved in 
criminal activities,” and otherwise “weaken the state and its institutions by corrupting 
officials, fraudulently acquiring documents and undeserved rights and tarnishing our 
image locally and abroad” (RSA 1999, 16).   
 
6.11   This kind of language directly contradicts assertions about the need to address 
xenophobia by “making communities understand the tragedy of illegal immigration” 
(RSA 1999, 21), and potentially undermines the stated desire to attract skilled personnel 
by contributing to a general mood of distrust about non-citizens.  Reports of harassment 
of highly skilled professionals from other African countries are common and are no doubt 
related to the high rates of xenophobia in the country as a whole (Crush 2000b: 
McDonald et al. 2000).  The proposals can only lead to further confusion and ill-
sentiment on the part of South African nationals about newcomers to the country.  
Xenophobia must be addressed in toto as an issue of basic human rights and not as 
something that suits the narrow sectoral economic interests of a country one way or the 
other (Mattes et al. 2000).   
 
6.12   A final tension relates to the question of where skilled immigrants are expected to come 
from.  The White Paper laid out a hierarchy of immigration which seeks to “serve our 
people first; the people of the region and member states of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) second; the people of Africa third; and the rest of the 
world last” (RSA 1999, 9).  But it failed to explain how this order of preference will be 
attained (once again raising the tension of the role of the market versus the role of the 
state), whether this hierarchy is constitutionally sound, or whether the skills needs of 
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South Africa coincide with the geographic supply of the skilled immigrants it is hoping 
for.  The Immigration Bill is no more enlightening on this point.   If new legislation is to 
assist with this broader policy objective it would need to spell out in much more detail 
how it plans to achieve these objectives, whether it is appropriate to have geographically 
preferential immigration policies, whether it is practically feasible to implement, and 
what its implications might be for other SADC countries still concerned about a possible 
brain drain to South Africa.  In a world of global head-hunting for increasingly mobile 
skilled personnel, South African policy makers and immigration bureaucrats will need to 
be much more strategic in their efforts to attract the people they want, and will need to 
break down the false distinction between skilled and unskilled migrants if they are to deal 
with xenophobia as a whole. 
 
6.13  Finally, the new policy is remarkably quiet on what would be required to stem the flow of 
skilled personnel out of South Africa.  Part of the reason for this is the Constitutional 
right of South African citizens to move where they want (a right which millions of South 
Africans did not have under apartheid) and the reluctance of the South African 
government to institute policies to keep people in the country.  But it nevertheless begs 
the question of what policy mechanisms might reduce the so-called ‘push’ factors and 
convince people to stay.  This volume examines this issue in some detail in the South 
African context by examining the likes and dislikes of skilled nationals with respect to 
their home country and how they compare it to their “most likely destination” if they 
were to leave.   
 
6.14   Not surprisingly, crime and safety come up as one of the main ‘push’ factors from South 
Africa.  But even higher on the dissatisfaction list of skilled South Africans are the 
“present level of taxation” and “relative share of taxes in comparison to others.”  This 
concern with taxes pertains to much more than just emigration, of course, and taxes are 
only part of a much larger emigration-potential puzzle amongst skilled South Africans.  
But given the high profile that tax (and fiscal reform in general) has in South Africa, it is 
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not inconceivable that levels of taxation could start to play an even bigger role in the 
emigration decision-making process.   
 
6.15   This potential is made all the more likely with the downward pressures on personal taxes 
for high-income earners in immigrant-receiving countries like the United States, and has 
sparked a furious debate in some countries (e.g., Canada) as to whether the personal tax 
differential is a source of their own brain drain.  Notably, the debate in Canada is divided 
on the issue (DeVoretz and Laryea 1998; Janigan 1998; Iqbal 1999). 
 
6.16   Nevertheless, as fiscal conservatism continues to gain momentum in South Africa it will 
no doubt become a more explicit tool for keeping (and attracting) skilled personnel.  But 
is this actually a line worth pursuing?  Would South Africa, in its efforts to retain skilled 
personnel, simply be engaging in a ‘race to the bottom’ of tax reforms?  This is a race 
that it can barely expect to win on an international scale given the relatively limited scope 
for further fiscal cuts in South Africa and growing pressures from an increasing pool of 
poor and unemployed South Africans for more progressive redistributive tax measures.   
 
6.17   Would South Africa not perhaps be better off addressing the concerns that skilled 
personnel have about crime and social upheaval with a more balanced redistributive fiscal 
framework, a fiscal framework that addresses the material roots of crime and unrest 
though poverty alleviation?   Tax issues cannot be ignored, of course, but to focus on 
these narrow economistic reasons for emigration risks the potential of competing in an 
international tax reform race that cannot be won.  The strategy also risks losing out on an 
opportunity to construct a more sound and attractive public sphere domestically that may 
ultimately go further in retaining the skills that South Africa needs.   
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7.0  Skilled Migration in Regional Context 
 
7.1   A central issue is the importance of thinking of skills migration issues regionally.  If 
regional integration in Southern Africa is going to take place in any meaningful way, the 
exchange of highly skilled personnel must be an integral part of it. At one level, this 
integration is already taking place, albeit at a slower pace than once anticipated.  In the 
sample of 400 skilled foreigners in South Africa, for example, a total of 41% were from 
Africa with 18% from Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.  In 
Botswana, 77% of the sample of skilled foreigners were from African countries with the 
majority of those from SADC countries.  In other words, there is a significant emerging 
regional exchange of skills taking place and SADC countries need to acknowledge, 
debate and support this interaction.  
 
7.2   Thinking regionally also brings into question the whole notion of a brain drain.  If skilled 
South Africans are working in Lesotho, or if skilled Zambians are working in Botswana, 
does this represent a loss of skills to the country of origin or does it represent a building 
and expanding of the skills base for the region as a whole?  This is particularly true if 
these skilled people are in regular contact with colleagues back home or if they return 
home to practice their trade.  A Zimbabwean doctor practising for ten years in South 
Africa may seem like a major loss to Zimbabwe at the time, but if this doctor returns with 
new skills and exposure to different systems it could create a ‘brain gain’ for the country 
in the end and for the region as a whole.   
 
7.3   In the end, of course, national boundaries remain a very tangible feature of the Southern 
African landscape, both physically and psychologically (McDonald 2000).  Colonial 
constructs die hard, and as the unsuccessful attempts to create a SADC Protocol on the 
Free Movement of People illustrate, it will be some time yet before national governments 
in SADC are able and willing to think favourably (let alone strategically) about the skills 
pool in the region as a whole.   Nevertheless, we can be optimistic about the potential for 
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southern African countries to attract and retain skilled personnel. The challenge for the 
policy makers will be to develop strategies based on sound empirical research in ways 
which benefit the region rather than play blindly into the lowest common denominators 
of globalization. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1. In 1993, Nelson Mandela made several public appeals to white South Africans not to leave because their skills 
were economically indispensable (Rule 1994, 34). 
2. The Re-integration of Qualified African National Programme (RQAN) was initiated in the early 1980s and 
involved (within SADC) Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia.  By the mid-1990s the programme has 
assisted 1,500 African nationals to return (450 to Zimbabwe alone and many of those from South Africa) (Weiss 
1998, 77).  Given these limited numbers, therefore, RQAN’s significance and impact seem to be primarily symbolic. 
3. The geographical scope of brain drain research needs to be expanded to compare more countries and there are still 
serious methodological challenges to be overcome (gaps in the demographic information on the skills profile in the 
region being the most significant).  A host of new questions also emerged from the research.  Other limitations 
derive from the quantitative research methods employed in these surveys.  Closed-option, Likert-style questionnaires 
are useful insofar as they allow for large sample sizes and comparative data analysis, but they are limited in their 
ability to ‘get under the skin’ of what motivates people to migrate (or not) and what their likely plans are for the 
future.  Only detailed qualitative interviews with smaller samples of skilled people can provide this kind of 
ethnographic information, work that SAMP intends to conduct as part of its future research mandate.   
4. The national sampling procedure deployed by SAMP in this particular study produced a South African sample 
that was 75% white.   This does not indicate racial bias in the actual methodology; rather, it is a testimony to its 
accuracy.  A white-biased sample is the inevitable result of sampling a population whose apartheid legacy is 
concentrated skills amongst whites in general, and white males in particular.    The sample size of black South 
Africans was still adequate to draw conclusions about migration intentions but these should be seen as provisional 
until confirmed by a larger study.  In addition, the emigration intentions of South Africa’s future skills base 
(universities in which blacks are much better represented)  are currently being researched by SAMP.         
5. In early 2001, a new Immigration Bill was tabled in Parliament to give effect to the recommendations of the 
White Paper.  Although there are inconsistencies between the White Paper and the Bill, in the area of skilled 
immigration the Bill does attempt to give legal substance to the White Paper’s proposals (and indeed the earlier 
recommendations of the Green Paper).   
6. The White Paper makes similar errors of judgement in its uncritical acceptance of the fact that “three to five 
million illegal immigrants” are living in South Africa (RSA 1999, 18), figures that have been criticized for being 
based on unreliable methodologies and unrealistic assumptions (Brunk 1996; Crush 1999; McDonald 2000).  
7. The Immigration Service was conceptualized as a quasi-independent body with considerable autonomy 
(somewhat akin to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service on which the drafter of the Bill based 
his model). The ANC has objected strongly to this proposal and a revised bill places the Service directly under the 
control of the Minister.  
8. For an analysis of the points system method of selecting skills and its potential relevance to South Africa, see 
Williams (1999).  
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